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Reasonableness, Rationality and Government: The Liberal Political
Thought of Mehdi Ha’eri Yazdi
Rawls formulates liberalism according to two conceptions of reasonable and rational,
which, tied to two particular notions of society and person, deﬁne the basis of
liberalism in Rawlsian thought. This article argues that Mehdi Haeri Yazdi’s
important work, Hekmat va Hokumaat, should be considered as a work of liberal
theory, and shows how it endorses liberal conceptions of the reasonable and the
rational. The main elements of Ha’eri’s liberalism are his thesis that philosophy has
priority over jurisprudence, his doctrine of contract based upon concepts of agency
contract (aqd-e vekalat) and joint private ownership (malekiyat-e shakhsi-ye musha),
and his defense of individualism against the alleged collectivism of Rousseau.
Mehdi Ha’eri Yazdi (1923–99) was one of the most important scholars of what is
called “Islamic philosophy” in contemporary Iran.1 Hekmat va Hokumat, published
in 1995 in London, is Ha’eri Yazdi’s main work of political theory. This article
includes a detailed reading ofHekmat va Holumat, arguing that Ha’eri should be con-
sidered as a liberal political theorist. We will see how he uses some traditional concepts
from Islamic philosophy and jurisprudence, particularly notions of “joint private
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1Mehdi Ha’eri Yazdi was the son of the renowned Grand Ayatollah Abdulkarim Ha’eri Yazdi, one of
main Shiite authorities (maraje’) of his time, and the one who made Qom the main site of Shi’a studies in
Iran. At the age of twenty-eight he received his ordination as exegesis (ejtehad), the highest degree in tra-
ditional Islamic sciences, particularly Islamic law, from Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi, the main Shi’a auth-
ority after the death of his father. In 1952, Tehran University accepted Ha’eri’s ejtehad degree as
equivalent to a doctorate degree in theology and he became a faculty member of Tehran University’s
theology department. Later, he enrolled in the PhD program at the University of Toronto, where he
received another doctorate in 1979. In 1979, he returned to Iran to resume his post as professor of
Islamic philosophy at Tehran University and his association with the Iranian Academy of Philosophy.
He died in Tehran in July 1999, aged seventy-six. Apart from Hekmat va Hokumat, discussed in this
article, he wrote ten other books, mainly about Islamic philosophy. Other than The Principles of Epistem-
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ownership” and “agency contract,” in order to develop a reasonable contract theory. As
a framework for deﬁning reasonableness and the normative demands of liberalism, I
will use John Rawls’s political liberalism.
The ﬁrst section contains my own interpretation of Rawls’s ideas of reasonableness
and rationality. Based on this initial step, and analyzing different aspects ofHekmat va
Hokumat, I will then argue that Ha’eri Yazdi should be regarded as a liberal thinker.
To do this, I will ﬁrst consider what may be called Ha’eri’s argument about the priority
of Islamic philosophy to Islamic jurisprudence. I will then discuss Ha’eri’s thesis of
government as the agency of joint private owners, explaining how this doctrine is con-
structed on traditional notions of agency compact (aqd-e vekalat) and joint private
ownership (malekiyat-e shakhsi-ye musha) in Shi’a jurisprudence. This part is followed
by my interpretation of Ha’eri’s defense of individualism against collectivism, based on
his linguistic distinction between the universal (kolli) and the whole (koll) while cri-
ticizing Rousseau’s social contract, and claiming that the voluntary nature of shari’a is
incompatible with the coercive nature of state power. From this analysis, I will con-
clude that Ha’eri Yazdi’s Hekmat va Hokumat should be regarded as a reasonable
and liberal doctrine in the way that reasonableness and liberalism are interpreted by
John Rawls.
Reasonableness and Rationality in Rawls’s Political Liberalism
Political liberalism is the account of liberalism Rawls developed in the later period of
his life. According to Rawls’s theory, liberalism is linked to two fundamental ideas: the
reasonable, and the rational. The origin of the distinction between the two terms goes
back to Kantian ethics, where Kant differentiates between categorical and hypothetical
imperatives, although its present format is Rawls’s invention.2 Rawls deﬁnes reason-
ableness as being “ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of
cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others will like-
wise do so.”3 In other words, reasonableness includes the part of our moral sensibility
2John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York, 1996), 48–49.
3Rawls, Political Liberalism, 49. Here I need to address one possible objection. In Political Liberalism,
Rawls also articulates a second criterion for reasonableness that I have neglected in my interpretation.
This element is what Rawls calls “the burdens of judgment.” What is my argument for this omission?
In my interpretation of political liberalism, it seems acceptable to keep the ﬁrst condition of reasonable-
ness, i.e. willingness to get involved in social cooperation provided that others do the same, and exclude
the second one, i.e. the burdens of judgment. It seems to me that including the appropriate conceptions of
person and society is both a necessary and sufﬁcient criterion for the reasonableness of a doctrine. Put
another way, the burdens of judgment apparently can be discarded without resulting in a signiﬁcant
problem for maintaining the main ideas of political liberalism, such as public reason, the original position,
the reﬂective equilibrium, overlapping consensus, etc. As Wenar argues, there seems to be no strong argu-
ment proving that abandonment of the burdens of judgment is fatal for the entire Rawlsian project of
political liberalism. Furthermore, the burdens of judgment seem to be incompatible with the ﬁrm reli-
gious beliefs of the faithful, and one might even argue that excluding them from the criterion of reason-
ableness is a recommendable step for applying political liberalism to more religious societies, including
Muslim majority ones. Wenar suggests that the burdens of judgment are not acceptable for many religious
520 Badamchi
that connects with the idea of fair social cooperation and reciprocity.4 For Rawls, a
political doctrine is reasonable and rational, and thus liberal, if it includes two funda-
mental elements: ﬁrst, an idea of society as “a fair system of cooperation over time,
from one generation to the next”; and second, an idea of citizens (those engaged in
cooperation) as “free and equal persons.”5 These conceptions of the society and the
person are normative, belonging to the domain of moral (political).
Furthermore, reasonableness and rationality are very closely tied to the two moral
powers which Rawls attributes to citizens in a democratic society: the reasonable is
connected to citizens’ sense of justice, i.e. their capacity to understand, apply and
act according to justice; the rational is connected to citizens’ moral power to deter-
mine and revise their conception of the good. Thus, reasonableness is linked to the
idea of social cooperation whereas rationality is connected to the idea of freedom.
Rationality is guided by the principle of choosing the most effective means to an
end. It expresses “a scheme of ﬁnal ends and attachments together with a comprehen-
sive doctrine in the light of which those elements are interpreted.”6 Rationality also
applies to how one’s ends are given priority and how they cohere with each other,
which is different from the demands of reasonableness. Finally, the idea of rationality
embodies an important part of Rawls’s idea of autonomy as well.7
The core of the idea of rationality, one might argue, is freedom. As mentioned
above, according to Rawls’s concept of rationality, each person has a capacity to
form, revise and pursue a conception of rational advantage or good. However, each
person’s conception of the good is not ﬁxed, but develops as the person matures,
and may even change radically over their lifetime.8 This is the ﬁrst meaning of
freedom according to Rawls’s idea of rationality, and it implies that, when a person
converts from one religion to another, she should not lose her constitutional
rights.9 Rawls’s rationality also implies that people are free in a second sense, of
believers, such as Catholics. Similarly, Andrew March argues that to base political liberalism’s normativity
on the burdens of judgment may make genuine overlapping consensus between orthodox Islamic law and
political liberalism questionable. Thus, there seem to be enough reasons for excluding the burdens of judg-
ment from the criteria of reasonableness, and keeping only the ﬁrst condition. In other words, I consider
reasonableness mainly as being ready to propose principles of fair cooperation and to abide by them pro-
vided that others do the same. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, 54f; Leif Wenar, “Political Liberalism: An
Internal Critique,” Ethics 106 (October 1995), 41f; Andrew March, Islam and Liberal Citizenship: The
Search for an Overlapping Consensus (Oxford, 2009), 272–3
4Rawls, Political Liberalism, 50–51.
5Ibid., 14; cf. 107f. Rawls also mentions a third idea of “a well-ordered society as a society effectively
regulated by a political conception of justice.”However, it can be argued that the elements of the idea of a
well-ordered society are already embedded in the two ideas of society as a fair system of cooperation and
persons as free and equal citizens. Put another way, the idea of a well-ordered society seems to be a com-
bination of the main elements of the politically liberal conceptions of society and person. Rawls clearly
implies this when he says “a well-ordered society” is “a fair system of cooperation between reasonable and
rational citizens regarded as free and equal.” See ibid., 103.
6Ibid., 108.
7Ibid., 72.
8Ibid., 19–20.
9Ibid., 30.
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being self-authenticating sources of valid claims. Here, people are free because they are
“entitled to make claims on their institutions so as to advance their conception of the
good,” so slaves are not free, for example, because they are not counted as sources of
valid claims. As Rawls puts it, slaves are “socially dead: they are not recognized as
persons at all.”10 Therefore, any political theory which justiﬁes slavery, in lacking
such a perception of freedom, contradicts Rawls’s ideas of rationality and reasonable-
ness. There is also a third aspect in which people are viewed as free according to
Rawls’s deﬁnition of rationality. Here, freedom means a person’s capability of
taking responsibility for her ends.11 This means that persons are capable of restricting
their claims to the kinds of things the principles of justice allow. I need to add that
these three senses of freedom, and the idea of rationality which encompasses them,
are modeled in Rawls’s original position.12
The ideas of the reasonable and rational are connected to particular liberal con-
ceptions of society and person. As a result, for Rawls, only those political doctrines
which include such liberal conceptions of society and person are to be considered as
reasonable and rational: “The reasonable is an element of the idea of society as a
system of fair cooperation.”13 Reasonableness is thus incompatible with non-liberal
notions of society, such as viewing society “as a ﬁxed natural order, or as institutional
hierarchy justiﬁed by religious or aristocratic values.”14 A non-literal conception of
society lacks the idea of reciprocity. Reciprocity means that “all who are engaged in
cooperation and who do their part, as the rules and procedure require, are to
beneﬁt in an appropriate way as assessed by a suitable benchmark of comparison.”15
The notions of reasonable and rational draw upon a particular conception of the
person which follows from the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation; that
is, a person who takes part or plays a role in social life. The person is someone
“who can be a citizen, that is, a normal and fully cooperating member of society
over complete life.”16 In contrast, a society in which individuals’ basic rights depend
on their religious afﬁliation and social class has a non-liberal conception of the
person.17 Such a society lacks the idea of persons as free and equal, reasonable and
rational. Finally, according to Rawls’s idea of personhood, someone who has not devel-
oped the twin moral powers of reasonableness and rationality to a minimum requisite
degree cannot be a normal and fully cooperating member of a democratic society.18
From this outline of Rawls’s ideas one can conclude that a political doctrine is
unreasonable and irrational when it lacks a minimum amount of social cooperation,
and/or when it does not allow people to rationally revise their conception of the good
10Ibid., 33.
11Ibid., 33; cf. 72.
12Ibid., 72f.
13Ibid., 49–50.
14Ibid., 15.
15Ibid., 16.
16Ibid., 18.
17Ibid., 30.
18Ibid., 74.
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during their lifetime. In the next section, I will argue that, as interpreted through Raw-
lsian political philosophy, the doctrine of the guardianship of the jurist is an unreason-
able comprehensive doctrine because it is irreconcilable with the liberal conception of
society and person presented above. Following this, I will demonstrate how Muslim
philosophical and legal tradition, as presented in Mehdi Haeri Yazdi’s Hekmat va
Hokumat, includes the fundamental ideas of society as a fair system of cooperation,
and persons as free and equal citizens, as the primary and the necessary requirements
of a liberal political theory.
The Priority of Islamic Philosophy to Islamic Jurisprudence
The title of Haeri Yazdi’s main book on political theory, Hekmat va Hokumat, was
chosen with a lot of care and attention. As I understand it, this title represents
what may be called Ha’eri’s prioritizing of Islamic philosophy over Islamic jurispru-
dence, and embodies one of his main arguments for the necessity of a reasonable
Muslim political theory. In Ha’eri’s terminology, “hekmat” refers to Muslim practical
philosophy while “hokumat” draws on notions of government, state, politics and
sovereignty.
In Islamic tradition, particularly the Iranian one, there are two words which usually
refer to Islamic philosophy: one is hekmat and the other is falsafeh. Some commenta-
tors believe that hekmat has a much wider meaning than falsafeh, arguing that a good
deal of rational Islamic theology (kalam) should be classiﬁed as hekmat, such as in the
case of theoretical mysticism (tasavvof-e nazari). Ha’eri, however, seems to use falsafeh
and hekmat interchangeably as more or less equivalent to each other. Following Aris-
totle, as well as Ibn Sina and other classical Muslim philosophers, Ha’eri divides
hekmat into theoretical (hekmat-e nazari) and practical branches (hekmat-e
amali).19 This division corresponds to his division of being into “unwilled existence”
(vujud-e namaqdur) and “willed existence” (vujud-e maqdur). Whereas the existence
of unwilled beings is independent of the human will, willed beings are brought into
the realm of existence only through the consequences of human action and behavior.
While theoretical Islamic philosophy is mainly concerned with unwilled beings, Ha’eri
argues, practical Muslim philosophy studies willed beings.20 This means thatHokumat
is a willed being to be studied by hekmat, i.e. Muslim practical philosophy, as inter-
preted reasonably.
Hekmat and hokumat are tied to each other. In Persian, hokumat means govern-
ment, sovereignty, state or politics, depending on the context. However, a Muslim pol-
itical theory, Ha’eri argues, cannot be developed without relying on philosophy
because political thought cannot be rooted only in jurisprudence ( feqh). As a result,
he rejects the idea of the guardianship of the jurist (velayat-e faqih) in that the govern-
ment “is not a superior divine metaphysical reality” in the manner that guardianship of
19Mehdi Ha’eri Yazdi, Jostarha-ye Falsaﬁ (Tehran, 2005), 411–12.
20Mehdi Ha’eri Yazdi, Hekmat va Hokumat (London, 1995), 11–15.
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the jurist theory proposes.21 Rather, government, or hokumat, is simply a human
phenomenon and jurists are wrong in thinking that the administration of state lies
within the orbit of shari’a:
Literally speaking, hokm and hokumat are derived from Arabic hakama, yahkumu,
hukman. Both mean to order, to judge, to arbitrate, to settle in judgment. In the
science of politics, hokumat means the art of administration and thinking about
how to rationally manage domestic and international affairs of the country.
However, in Islamic philosophy and logic, hokm means to admit a predicative
relation in a proposition, i.e. judgmental knowledge (elm-e tasdiqi) versus concep-
tual knowledge (elm-e tasavvori).… hokm and hokumat have to be viewed as the
judgmental knowledge of forming, directing and administrating states, rather
than [Islamic] guardianship.22
In order to develop a reasonable (in the Rawlsian sense) model of government
(hokumat), one primarily has to rely on Islamic practical philosophy (hekmat),
rather than the holy texts per se, or jurısprudence. Hokumat, as derived from
hekmat, is incompatible with the very idea of the guardianship of the jurist, which jus-
tiﬁes itself solely by appealing to Islamic shari’a. In cases of conﬂict in political affairs
between philosophy (especially Islamic practical philosophy, as reasonably interpreted)
on the one hand, and Shi’a jurisprudence on the other, one should side with practical
philosophy. In other words, if we are going to develop a reasonable theory of govern-
ment, we have to give a secondary role to jurisprudence as compared to other intellec-
tual Islamic sciences, especially philosophy. It is useful to note here that, in addition to
being a philosopher, Ha’eri was also a jurist. As mentioned earlier, he had permission
for ejtehad, or exegesis in Shi’a jurisprudence, from Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi. Yet he
believed that a reasonable account of Islamic philosophy should be given greater con-
sideration than the science of jurisprudence in solving both theoretical and practical
issues concerning state affairs and politics. For Ha’eri, the implication is that any
theory of government that solely relies on jurisprudence at the cost of neglecting
the requirements of philosophy has to be regarded as unreasonable, and even
irrational. The doctrine of the guardianship of the Shi’a jurist (velayat-e faqih),
which regards Muslims as invalids or minors, in need of the care of a guardian
(vali), is a clear example of such unreasonableness and irrationality, and has to be
rejected. Viewing persons that way is incompatible with the reasonable consideration
of them as citizens, i.e. as free, equal and cooperating members of society, and also
neglects the fact that they should be able to revise their conception of the good
during the lifetime. In short, these factors make the guardianship of the jurist
theory an illiberal doctrine in the Rawlsian sense.
In the last two chapters of Hekmat va Hokumat, Ha’eri discusses the theory of
velayat-e faqih in more detail. In contemporary Shi’a thought, this doctrine was
21Ibid., 64–5.
22Ibid., 54–5.
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most eloquently expressed ﬁrst in 1970 by Ayatollah Khomeini in his velayat-e faqih
lessons in Najaf (Iraq), later published as Governance of the Jurist: Islamic Government.
Khomeini held that the authority of vali-ye faqih (the supreme leader) was invested in
him by the twelfth Shi’a Imam, Mahdi, and argued that the basis of the supreme
jurist’s authority rested on the Shi’a Muslim’s obligation to obey God, his Prophet
and the Twelve Infallible Imams. For Khomeini, who had been one of Mehdi
Ha’eri Yazdi’s former tutors in Qom as well, political obligation was subsumed
under the religious obligation to obey the Imam.
Khomeini believed that the Islamic state is part of the very idea of Muslimhood,
arguing that history showed that Muhammad had established the ﬁrst Islamic govern-
ment, and that the necessity for such an Islamic state was not conﬁned to the Pro-
phet’s time, but rather has continued since his death. According to Khomeini’s
interpretation of the Qur’an, the ordinances of Islam and shari’a are therefore not
limited to a particular time or place; they are permanent and must be enacted until
the end of time: “They were not revealed merely for the time of the Prophet, only
to be abandoned thereafter,”23 so the hudud (Islamic penal code) still needs to be
enacted, the taxes prescribed by Islam still need to be collected, and the defense of
the lands and people of Islam must not be suspended. Since all of these tasks need
a state to implement them, Khomeini concluded that the claim that the laws of
Islam may remain in suspension or restricted to a particular time or place is contrary
to the essentials of Islam. “Law is God’s decree and command.” So the divine
command of Islam has absolute authority over all individuals for all eternity.24 The
ground for Khomeini’s theory had been prepared by the nineteenth century jurist
Molla Ahmad Naraqi (died in 1829) in his Avāyid al-Ayyām.
Ha’eri disagreed with both Khomeini and Naraqi, arguing that, in traditional Shi’a
jurisprudence, guardianship is only relevant in the cases of underage children (saghir)
and persons of unsound mind (majnun) who need their property, etc., protected by
others because of their own incompetence and invalidity. Ha’eri concluded that Khomei-
ni’s and Naraqi’s application of this model to the state–individual relationship was mis-
leading both philosophically and theologically. Philosophically, it is wrong because it
deprives individuals of their rights, denies their human autonomy and may lead to des-
potism.Ha’eri therefore rejects the argument of theorists of the guardianship of the jurist,
such as Naraqi and Ayatollah Khomeini, that hokumat can be equated with velayat:
Velayat, in the meaning of guardianship, conceptually and essentially is different
from hokumat. Guardianship is the right of the guardian to possess the private
property and rights of a ward, who for reasons such as immaturity, being of
unsound mind, lunacy, and so on, is incompetent to take possession of his property
and rights. In contrast, hokumat and statesmanship equate to the reasonable man-
23Imam Khomeini, Governance of the Jurist (Velayat-e Faqeeh): Islamic Government, trans. Hamid
Algar (Tehran: n.d.), 19. Available online at: http://www.iranchamber.com/history/rkhomeini/books/
velayat_faqeeh.pdf (accessed 9 April 2014).
24Ibid., 29.
The Liberal Political Thought of Mehdi Ha’eri Yazdi 525
agement of the affairs of a particular political and geographical territory [Greek
polis]. Statesmanship of government is a position that should be transferred to a
competent, rational and reasonable person or institution by the citizens who are
the real owners of the city or country. Put another way, hokumat is a hypothetical
or real agency contract between citizens and their agents as some persons or insti-
tutions. Velayat, which is equivalent to the possession of all the rights of an incom-
petent or ward by a guardian, seems to be inappropriate for social and public affairs.
Guardianship is essentially a private relationship which cannot be extended to
public life and relations.25
In short, government (hokumat) is distinct from guardianship (velayat), and thus one
of the main sources of unjust and criminal attitudes within dictatorial states derives
from neglecting this distinction.26
Ha’eri’s philosophical argument is also complemented by a theological argument
that aims to question validity of the guardianship of the jurist theory in Islamic
terms. The words of the Prophet and Shi’a Imams, called the hadith, carry authority
in Shi’a jurisprudence. Ha’eri believes that the supporters of guardianship misinterpret
some of the words of Shi’a authorities in order to justify their position. In their
interpretation of the term faqih in hadiths such as “fuqaha [the plural of faqih] are
havens of Islam, “fuqaha are trustees of prophets,” and so on, the theorists of the guar-
dianship of the jurist doctrine equate the term faqih with a person who is knowledge-
able in jurisprudence, thereby interpreting such words by Shi’a authorities as
indicating the origins of a theory of the Islamic state.27 Appealing to Molla Sadra,
Ha’eri instead interprets the word faqih as a person who is well-versed in the mystical
and spiritual sciences of Islam in order to argue that it is incorrect to interpret faqih as
a person who is the most knowledgeable in Islamic jurisprudence.28 According to
Molla Sadra, equating the term faqih with a person who is simply well-versed in jur-
isprudence is a distortion of the truth of Islam because salvation, Molla Sadra argues, is
not limited to the practice of the legal orders of jurists. That is, whereas Islamic salva-
tion results from involving oneself in the mystical sciences, the science of faqih is
limited only to this world (dunya) and its worldly legal practices. It is a fallacy to
assume that jurists are the havens of Islam or trustees of the prophets, as Naraqi
and Khomeini are inclined to do. Thus, referring to Molla Sadra’s commentary on
Koleyni’s Ūsūl al-Kāﬁ book, “the Chapter of Reason and Ignorance,” Ha’eri argues
that jurisprudence is a this-worldly science, rather than a science of salvation, so
being expert in Islamic jurisprudence does not necessarily result in spiritual salvation.
25Ha’eri, Hekmat va Hokumat, 177; cf. 61, 57, 178.
26Ibid., 57.
27al-fuqahā husūn ul-Islam kahusnu sur al-madinatu lahā, and al-fuqahā umanā ul-rusul, two hadiths
from the sixth Imam of the Shi’as, Imam Jafar Sadiq. See Yaqub Koleyni, “Ketab-e Aqlo Jahl”
(The Chapter of Reason and Ignorance), Usul-e Kaﬁ; quoted in Ha’eri, Hekmat va Hokumat, 180.
28Ibid., 187.
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He concludes that jurists cannot be regarded as the most knowledgeable rulers from an
Islamic point of view.29
Furthermore, according to Islamic teaching, the divine right to rule is limited solely
to infallibles. Only the infallibles, i.e. the Prophet, his daughter Fatima and the Twelve
Shi’a Imams, have velayat over other believers. No fallible person, including a Muslim
jurist, can claim a right to political leadership and divine velayat. Thus, from a religious
perspective, since the guardianship of the jurist attributes the divine right of ruling to
fallible people (i.e. Muslim jurists, whose knowledgeableness of jurisprudence is irrele-
vant), it should be rejected as a false doctrine.
In addition, even the political leadership rights of the Infallible Imams or the
Prophet himself can only be implemented if there is a consensus of believers. In
other words, the Imams’ potential right to political leadership, contrary to what the
guardianship of the jurist theory seems to claim, can only be realized if political leader-
ship is transferred to an imam or prophet by the people.30 Although the infallible
Prophet or Imams are considered to be supremely talented in statesmanship, Ha’eri
argues that such skill cannot be used unless people select them to lead. This explains
how Muhammad and Imam Ali became political leaders of the Muslim community at
particular moments of their lives. It also explains why Ali, who was potentially the
most talented ruler of the Muslim community after the Prophet, abstained from
making any claim to political leadership for twenty years, during the period when
Abu Bakr, Umar and Usman were the Caliphate, until the people came to his
door and selected him as their leader following the death of Usman.31 Although,
like the Prophet Muhammad, Ali was infallible, he only became a political leader
when the Muslim community themselves became mature enough to understand his
particular talents and select him as their ruler.
This account leads Ha’eri to suggest that is very unlikely that the jurists have a
divine right of leadership when even the Infallibles, who according to Shi’a theology
have a special ontological status in the universe, did not have the right to rule commu-
nity without the consensus of the governed. Finally, according to some Muslim phi-
losophers, only Imams have access to a mystically illuminated knowledge about reality
and existence, while the rest of the people, including the jurists, lack such an advantage.
Thus, the theory of the guardianship of the jurist is deeply ﬂawed according to Islamic
doctrine.
All in all, to use John Rawls’s terminology, the guardianship of the jurist doctrine is
unreasonable, both philosophically and theologically. For Rawls, unreasonable
29Ibid., 188–91.
30Ibid., 142–3; cf. 168–76.
31In Ha’eri’s interpretation, this verse of the Qur’an refers to this fact when Allah says to the Prophet:
“Certainly was Allah pleased with the believers when they pledged allegiance to you, [O Muhammad],
under the tree, and He knew what was in their hearts, so He sent down tranquility upon them and
rewarded them with an imminent conquest” (Qur’an, Sūra48: āyat:18, translated by Sahih international
translation, http://quran.com). According to this verse, Ha’eri (Hekmat va Hokumat) argues, revelation
appoints an infallible prophet or Imam as the political leader only if the people’s consensus already exists.
Ibid., 168.
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doctrines are unwilling to engage in social cooperation, unless based on their own self-
interest. They are unlikely to propose any standards of justice for specifying the terms of
cooperation, and do not acknowledge the fact of reasonable pluralism.32However, as we
will see, Ha’eri Yazdi’s account of contract, called government as the agency of joint
private owners, agrees with Rawls’s normative demands about liberalism.
Government as the Agency of Joint Private Owners
Like classical European theories of social contract, Hekmat va Hokumat endorses an
idea of the state of nature.33 Ha’eri argues that, before entering society, in the state of
nature, each human being naturally occupies a place of residence, and, over time, the
person develops a sense of belonging to this place. This sense of belonging is the result
of her human corporality and forms the basis for the idea of natural ownership called
“exclusive private ownership” (malekiyat-e shakhsi-ye enhesari) when it is limited to a
small and almost private space.34 However, in most cases, the initial private exclusive
inhabitant forms part of a larger and penetrable common residence where people live
together with their families and fellows. This means that, in addition to the exclusive
private ownership of a particular space, each person is also the joint owner of a larger
residential environment. The people who live in this shared place, or natural habi-
tation, enjoy a joint ownership called “joint private ownership” (malekiyat-e
shakhsi-ye musha). In Ha’eri’s view, both exclusive and joint private ownerships are
essentials of our human life and are simply driven from the corporal nature of our
human bodies. Both private ownerships are natural, in the sense that they are based
upon our natural sense of belonging to our inhabitance. Thus, exclusive and joint
private ownerships should not be confused with non-natural private ownership,
which is constructed only after entering into a society based on human convention.35
The concepts of exclusive and joint private ownership in Hekmat va Hokumat are
partly inspired by a principle in Islamic jurisprudence traditionally used to justify
private property, according to which “the forefront occupants of a space are its
owners.” A saying with the same content is also attributed to the Prophet.36 These
concepts are also well-known in the Islamic jurisprudence literature, where a standard
32Rawls, Political Liberalism, 50. For Rawls, a country will have a stable liberal democracy only if the
number of people who adhere to unreasonable doctrines (e.g. guardianship of the jurist) is “outweighed by
the appropriate conduct of a sufﬁcient number of others.” See John Rawls, The Law of Peoples: With “The
Idea of Public Reason Revisited” (Cambridge, MA, 1999), 15.
33We should not interpret Hekmat va Hokumat’s state of nature as an actual state, nor should we
interpret its agency contract as an agreement that actually took place. In other words, Ha’eri is not con-
cerned with giving an historical account of how government came about. Rather, his doctrine is best
viewed not as explaining the origin of government, but rather as an attempt to provide “philosophical
knowledge” about the concept of the state so that we can better understand our political rights and obli-
gations when such a government exists. Here I am following Rawls’s interpretation of Hobbesian con-
tractarianism. See John Rawls, Lectures on History of Political Philosophy, ed. Samuel Freeman
(Cambridge, MA, 2007), 30–32.
34Ha’eri, Hekmat va Hokumat, 99.
35Ibid., 96–105.
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example of joint private ownership is an immovable property assigned to a number of
heirs following the death of the original owner (usually a family member). In these
cases, each heir becomes the joint private owner of the property. Such ownerships
are private in the sense they exist independently and the owners do not violate the
individuality and autonomy of each other.37 It should be noted that, although the con-
cepts of exclusive and joint private ownership are intrinsically inspired by some Islamic
sources, they may be considered as inherently secular, because they exist independently
from and prior to the law of shari’a.38
In the state of nature, wemay face a situationwhere different residents have conﬂicting
claims about their joint share of ownership. Such competition between different occu-
pants in the state of nature over property claims makes the need for a protection
system protecting us from each other’s egoistic excesses inevitable.39 One Islamic juris-
prudence principle asserts that “people are sovereigns of their properties” (al-nasūmusal-
litūna alā amvalihim). Inspired by this, Ha’eri argues for constructing an agency
mechanism, later called the government, in order to settle disputes and provide security.
In order to achieve this, joint private owners select a group of agents, or an institution, as
their representative in the neighborhood. To use Rawls’s terminology, the task of these
agents, or their related institution, is the fair distribution of social cooperation beneﬁts.40
If we enlarge our scale, the joint private ownership of the neighborhood later turns into
the joint private ownership of the city, the country or nation.41
In order to organize their affairs, the joint private owners develop an agency con-
tract (aqd-e vekalat) between themselves and one or a group of elected agents. Govern-
ment is thus the transference of some of the powers and responsibilities of joint
owners to their agents through a private agency contract, which is why Ha’eri’s
thesis of government as the agency of joint private owners rejects all forms of govern-
ment which are not grounded on the democratic consensus of the people, particularly
the idea of the guardianship of the jurist. Instead of grounding political obligation on
divine command, Hekmat va Hokumat bases it on the agreement of the joint private
owners of the country, i.e. the citizens, with the duties and powers of the agents (poli-
ticians) being limited only to what is transmitted to them by the owners. This also
entails that, based on the rules of Shi’a jurisprudence, as far as private contracts are
concerned, joint private owners can one-sidedly abrogate the agreement at any time
if they ﬁnd their agents violating the terms of the compact and depose them for
breach of trust. The fact that the ownership is joint and private means that the selected
agent(s) should take into account the interests and beneﬁts of all owners
independently and equally, and avoid preferring one owner over the others.42 In
36Man sabaqa ilāma lam yasbaq fahuva ahaqqu bihi. See Hurr-i Amuli, ed., “Ādabu al-Tijara,” Vasā’lu
al-Shi’a , vol. 12; quoted in ibid., 104.
37Ibid., 104.
38Ibid., 97.
39Ibid., 85.
40See Rawls, Political Liberalism, 16f.
41Ha’eri, Hekmat va Hokumat, 113.
42Ibid., 120–21.
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short, in Ha’eri’s theory, citizens are joint private owners of their neighborhood, city
or nation, who voluntarily transfer some of their powers and responsibilities to the
state through a private compact.
In my understanding, Ha’eri’s conception of the government as agency of joint
private owners recognizes mutual respect and leads to a liberal idea of toleration; all
the citizens have occupied the same neighborhood (or city or country on a larger
scale) equally, with the same rights and responsibilities, and because of this equal,
though independent, status—in the both state of nature and afterwards in society
—intolerance is unjustiﬁable. Because of the fact that natural and private joint own-
ership is valid regardless of a person’s gender, religion, social status (which does not
exist in the state of nature), race, etc., Hekmat va Hokumat is compatible with
what Will Kymlicka calls an equal concern for individuals as the basis of all contem-
porary varieties of Anglo-American political theory, including liberalism.43 In the logic
ofHekmat va Hokumat, since the state is supposed to be the agent of all individuals in
an equal manner, regardless of whether they are Shi’a or Sunni, Muslim or Christian,
faithful or apostate, majority or minority, the state’s unequal service to individuals
from different religious backgrounds, as is the case with Naraqi and Khomeini’s guar-
dianship of the jurist theory, becomes unjustiﬁable. Since each citizen is assumed to
equally enjoy the natural right of joint ownership, she has to have equal status
before the national law. Similarly, because all the people are assumed to have made
an identical private agency contract with the state, they should beneﬁt from the advan-
tages of such contract equally.
Ha’eri’s thesis of government as the agency of the joint owners justiﬁes only a liberal
democratic constitution, and regards the idea of an Islamic constitution, such as the
present constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as unreasonable. For Ha’eri,
the constitution should be regarded as the ofﬁcial exempliﬁcation of the agency con-
tract between the joint owners and the sovereign, determining the boundaries, con-
ditions, limits and quality of the power voluntarily transferred to the state by the
people, and thus cannot be theocratic.44
I mentioned earlier that, according to John Rawls’s political liberalism, a political
theory needs to contain two ideas in order to be considered reasonable and rational:
ﬁrst, it needs to elaborate an idea of citizens as free and equal persons; second, it needs
to contain an idea of society as a fair system of cooperation between free and equal
individuals. As we saw in this section, these two fundamental ideas are visible in
Ha’eri’s arguments for government as the agency of joint owners. The conceptions
of agency and joint ownership that he links together imply the idea of a willingness
to propose and abide by principles of fair cooperation, as Rawls’s criterion of reason-
ableness demands. As far as Rawls’s idea of freedom and rationality is concerned,
Hekmat va Hokumat’s defense of individualism against Rousseau’s alleged collectivism
provides a further argument for liberalism in Mehdi Ha’eri Yazdi’s political thought.
43See Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (Oxford, 2002), 3f.
44Ha’eri, Hekmat va Hokumat, 215–20.
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Individualism versus Collectivism: Criticizing Rousseau
Surprisingly, a critique of Rousseau is one of the important themes of Hekmat va
Hokumat, and other political writings by Mehdi Ha’eri.45 In this section I will not
discuss the plausibility of his interpretation of Rousseau. Rather, my concern is
with the implications of this evaluation for Ha’eri’s liberalism, especially Rawls’s
idea of rationality, and the concepts of freedom which are connected to it.
Ha’eri mostly links his criticism of Rousseau to a linguistic analysis based on the
distinction between koll and kolli in traditional Muslim philosophy. In an autobiogra-
phical interview in the last years of his life, the interviewer, noticing Rousseau’s Social
Contract on Ha’eri’s ofﬁce table, curiously asked what the difference was between his
view of the contract and Jean Jacques Rousseau’s. Ha’eri answered:
My [contractarianism] is very different from that of Rousseau. In my view, a plural
name has [at least] two forms. On the one hand, we have the summing plural
(vahed-e majmu’i) which represents whole versus part relationships.…On the
other hand, we have the encompassing plural ( jami’) which reﬂects universal
versus individual relationships, rather than whole versus part.… If we are going
to endorse autonomy and an independent character for individuals in a community,
we have to explain the relationship between the community and the individual with
a universal versus individual rather than a whole versus part model, which is
endorsed by Rousseau in his account of the relationship between community
and individuals.46
Along these lines, Ha’eri places Rousseau and Hegel in the same category, considering
both as collectivists and defenders of particular types of false holism. Thus, Ha’eri’s
refutation of Rousseau is a liberalism contra collectivism type of refutation. Or, put
another way, Ha’eri’s primary concern in dealing with Rousseau is to demonstrate
the faults of collectivism and defend a liberal idea of the individual.
The ﬁrst chapters of the principles of jurisprudence (usul-e feqh) books which are
taught in Shi’a seminaries mostly contain various linguistic debates.47 Perhaps owing
to this, the main analytic device Ha’eri uses in order to attack Rousseau’s alleged col-
lectivism, and to defend a rights-based liberalism, is the Muslim philosophers’ linguis-
tic distinction between whole (koll) and universal (kolli). Koll (whole) refers to the
integration or collection of all components ( joz’), whereas universal includes all the
members of an assumed class or group ( fard). The members of a universal are
called individuals (afrad), while the components of whole are called parts (ajza).
Unlike the individual, which has all the characteristics of the universal, a part has
only some of the characteristics of the whole.
45Ibid., 85–95; cf. 466–73.
46Ibid., 381.
47Mehdi Ha’eri Yazdi, Falsafe-ye Tahlili va Nazariye-ye Shenakht dar Falsafe-ye Eslami: Taqrirat-e
Ostad Mehdi Ha’eri Yazdi, ed. Abdollah Nasri (Tehran, 2006), 24–9; cf. 45–7.
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According to this distinction, in an individualist theory of democracy we have to
consider the political society, or the social contract, as a universal rather than a
whole. Rousseau’s collectivism, however, places the relation between political society
and persons under the umbrella of a whole-part category, thereby providing a theor-
etical ground for depriving individuals of some of their rights.48 This confusion
between the whole and the universal is the fundamental fault of Rousseau’s social con-
tract. Being holistic rather than universalist in Ha’eri’s interpretation, Rousseau’s con-
cepts of the general will and the public person are rendered incompatible with the
autonomous status of individuals in a liberal-democratic theory.49 That is, Rousseau’s
conception of a political society deprives the person of her true personality and her
“independent and free existence.”50 Ha’eri, by contrast, claims that his view of govern-
ment as the agent of joint owners is based on the notion of a person who is free and
autonomous, having all the rights belonging to the universal concept of human being.
It regards a person’s autonomy or her rights as being independent of any public notion
of good, or religion, thus guaranteeing their freedom. In this regard, government as the
agency of joint owners stands in direct opposition to the theory of the guardianship of
the jurist, or the idea of an Islamic state, which conceives of citizens as incompetent
minors, or people of unsound mind.51 This again provides further proof that Ha’eri’s
theory of government as the agency of joint owners is compatible with the conceptions
of the society and person modeled in Rawls’s political liberalism, and that Hekmat va
Hokumat offers a reasonable and rational political doctrine from a Rawlsian perspec-
tive.
Ha’eri thinks that his theory of the relationship between person and society, based
on the distinction between whole and universal, and his correspondent idea of auton-
omy, can also be justiﬁed from Qur’anic verses. In the Qur’an, shari’a commandments
are directed to individuals rather than the collectivist whole:
The terms such as qowm (ethnic group), umma (nation of Islam) only refer to indi-
vidual persons not their sum. That is because the plural sum (vahed-e jam’i,
[another name for whole]) is a subjective, non-existing and illusive entity to
which no responsibility can be attributed. Only real individuals are able to bear
the burden of responsibility, and the logical foundation of this understanding of
the individual and his autonomy is… the universal versus the individual relation-
ship.52
48A careful reading of Rousseau’s Social Contract may prove that Ha’eri’s reading of Rousseau is pro-
blematic and unfaithful to the text. Nevertheless, I will not go into this debate here. See Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings, ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge, 1997).
49Ha’eri, Hekmat va Hokumat, 122–6; cf. 111.
50Ibid., 126.
51Ibid., 177–8; cf. 57, 61.
52Ibid., 159.
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Thus, the Qur’an does not attribute religious and moral responsibilities to the whole
but rather to individuals, and recognizes human autonomy and freedom. This freedom
is not absolute because people have to restrict their liberty within the boundaries of
reason. Otherwise, liberty will turn into barbarism and chaos. In short, liberty is incon-
ceivable without responsibility.53
Ha’eri complements this with a ﬁnal argument in favor of the incompatibility
between the non-oppressive nature of shari’a and the oppressive nature of state
power, claiming that there is a logical contradiction between the voluntary nature
of shari’a and the very idea of a religious state. He argues that the enforcement of
shari’a through coercion is self-contradictory and vicious, showing that Hekmat va
Hokumat’s understanding of shari’a law is consistent with the normative demands
of Rawls’s ideas of rationality and reasonableness.
Proponents of the idea of an Islamic state usually justify their position by appealing
to the Islamic principle of amr bil ma’ruf and nahy anil munkar (to bid what is lawful
and forbid what is unlawful). In his lectures on the guardianship of the jurist which
were referred to earlier in this article, Khomeini argued that the commitment to this
principle entails the creation of an Islamic state. However, this interpretation of shari’a
and its relationship with the state obviously violates what Rawls calls “the liberal prin-
ciple of legitimacy,” according to which “our exercise of political power is proper and
fully justiﬁable only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essen-
tials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of prin-
ciples and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational.”54 Therefore, as a
reasonable and rational account of Muslim political theory, Hekmat va Hokumat
rejects such an interpretation of amr bil ma’ruf and nahy anil munkar principle as vio-
lating the liberal principle of legitimacy.55
While considering philosophical secularism as quite incompatible with Islam,
Ha’eri apparently regards political secularism as a requirement of shari’a, and therefore
tries to reconcile the conception of shari’a law with the liberal-democratic principle of
freedom.56 He believes that shari’a cannot remain God’s law if it is imposed by the
state because the enforcement of shari’a by force is incompatible with the nature of
salvation, which can only be achieved through voluntary and rational actions.
Further, if shari’a is made mandatory through state power, the difference between
it and secular laws disappears. In other words, state imposition will transform
shari’a into secular rule, thereby depriving it of its sacred character. When the law
of shari’a is enforced coercively, it is no longer the rule of God that is vindicated,
but rather the state’s law.57 If God’s law is imposed by the state upon Muslims, the
concept of religious reward and punishment in the hereafter (akherat) loses its
53Ibid., 112.
54Rawls, Political Liberalism, 217.
55Ha’eri, Hekmat va Hokumat, 148–50; cf. 127–30, 166–8.
56Ha’eri’s argument here is partly based on Muslim theologians’ distinction between God’s cosmic will
(erade-ye takvini) and his revealed will (erade-ye tashri’i). See ibid., 127–9.
57Ibid., 324–5.
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logic, and those subject to the law can no longer be held responsible for violating the
law of God.58 The state imposition of shari’a law is clearly incompatible with Rawls’s
deﬁnition of the liberal idea of the person, and the fact that in liberalism a person’s
religious identities should not be confused with their constitutional identities.
As Rawls reminds us, “on the Road to Damascus Saul of Tarsus becomes Paul
the Apostle. Yet such a conversion implies no change in our public or institutional
identity.”59
Conclusion: Ha’eri Yazdi as a Liberal Political Theorist
For Rawls, a political theory is liberal only if it endorses liberal ideas of society and
person, and when it is compatible with their normative demands. Therefore, a political
doctrine which shares these understandings of society and person should also be
counted as reasonable and rational. The model of political though Ha’eri Yazdi pro-
poses to us in Hekmat va Hokumat satisﬁes these conditions and is both reasonable
and rational from the perspective of political liberalism. Ha’eri’s main arguments in
this book, including the priority of philosophy over jurisprudence, government as
the agency of joint owners, and his defense of individualism versus collectivism,
relate to various aspects of Rawlsian ideas of reasonableness and rationality. As a
work which rejects the guardianship of the jurist and the enforcement of shari’a
through the coercive power of the state on the one hand, and theorizes a doctrine
of contract based upon the traditional notions of agency contract and joint private
ownership (which already exist in the tradition of Islamic jurisprudence) on the
other, Hekmat va Hokumat represents a Muslim work of liberal theory, and Mehdi
Haeri Yazdi should be considered as a liberal thinker, at least as far as liberalism is
interpreted by John Rawls.
58Ha’eri does not make clear what he means by the voluntary status of Islamic law. For example, one
might ask whether Ha’eri’s theory would permit orthodox Muslims, in a Muslim majority society, to
adhere voluntarily to discriminatory parts of shari’a, such as hudud penalties, as an expression of their
religious freedom or not. In my understanding, Ha’eri’s interpretation of hudud, as one of the most con-
troversial parts of shari’a regarding human rights, might be similar to Mohammad Fadel’s interpretation
when he argues that Rawls’s political liberalism could be compatible with hudud penalties if those punish-
ments were regarded only as voluntary. Put another way, Fadel believes that only if regarded as choice-
based will the justiﬁcation for the hudud penalties be religious, rather than secular. Fadel admits that
in practice very few Muslims will volunteer to be penalized by the hudud. See Mohammad Fadel,
“Public Reason as a Strategy for Principled Reconciliation: The Case of Islamic Law and International
Human Rights Law,” Chicago Journal of International Law 8, no. 1 (2007): 16–20.
59Rawls, Political Liberalism, 31.
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